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ISSUES PERTAINING TO DERIVATIVE MARKET
PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS
ALISON M. GREGORY*
The market for derivative products has burgeoned in recent
years.1 As the derivative markets have grown, attention has increased
on issues pertaining to derivative market participants and the relation-
ships between market participants. Recently, various regulators and
industry associations have released guidelines or "best practices" for
market participants. Some of these guidelines and "best practices"
suggest internal policies and procedures for participants in the deriva-
tives markets. As discussed below, such guidelines and "best prac-
tices" may benefit the marketplace.
In addition, some of these guidelines or "best practices," such as
The Principles and Practices for Wholesale Financial Market Transac-
tions (the "Principles"),2 articulate certain standard assumptions that
many derivative market participants may make when entering into de-
rivative transactions, in the absence of a written agreement to the con-
trary. While some praise the establishment of such standard "best
practices" and assumptions, others wonder whether the "best prac-
tices" and, in particular, the assumptions present an accurate articula-
tion of the market's existing standards and assumptions. In fact,
certain "end users" (i.e., derivative market participants that are not
dealers) contend that the assumptions contained in the Principles re-
flect a "dealer bias." Furthermore, some wonder whether such stan-
dards might help establish certain courses of dealing that might be
used against market participants during litigation. Although market
participants disagree regarding, for example, the appropriateness of
* Stanford Law School, JD 1992. The views expressed herein are solely those of the au-
thor and are not to be attributed to any former or current employer.
1. Although estimates differ regarding the true size of the derivatives market, many famil-
iar with capital markets agree that it represents a significant portion of capital market transac-
tions. According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.'s ("ISDA") most
recent estimate, the over-the-counter (i.e., off-exchange) derivative market exceeds a value of
seventeen trillion United States dollars. Published by ISDA (1996).
2. See The Principles and Practices for Wholesale Financial Market Transactions (Aug. 17,
1995) (unpublished, on file with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) [hereinafter Princi-
ples]. As this Article went to press, a senior official of the the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York announced that it may call for a redraft of the Principles due to certain end-user criticisms.
See New York Fed May Revisit Best Practice Documents, DERIVATIVES WEEK, Jan. 27, 1997, at 1;
see also infra pp. 1191-93.
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certain of the assumptions articulated in the Principles, the supervi-
sory regulators' guidelines and industry associations' "best practices"
(including the Principles) provide a catalyst to initiate a discourse re-
garding such current guidelines, practices, and/or assumptions.
This Article will describe the increasing focus on such issues per-
taining to derivative market participants and their relationships, in ad-
dition to the continuing focus on derivative product-related issues. It
will then analyze the Principles as an illustrative example of a recent
release that includes helpful suggested practices and assumptions that
may either fill contract gaps or commence a discourse regarding the
nature of the parties' relationship.
DISCUSSION
A. Background: Product-Related Issues
For some time, regulators of and participants in United States de-
rivative markets have considered issues related to the legal classifica-
tion of derivative products. I will refer to such issues as "product-
related issues."
For instance, the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended,
("CEA") 3 requires that futures contracts4 trade on a contract market
designated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC") absent an applicable exemption, exclusion, or no-action re-
lief.5 This requirement has led to a considerable amount of time and
attention being dedicated to the identification of a futures contract
and the scope of various exclusions and exemptions. 6
In addition to issues arising under the CEA, some derivative mar-
ket participants have analyzed certain derivative products to ascertain
whether such products might constitute securities and thus be subject
to federal and/or state securities laws.7
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1994).
4. The term "futures contract" (i.e., "contracts for the purchase or sale of a commodity for
future delivery") is not defined in the CEA, although caselaw and CFTC releases have helped
establish a number of factors that are useful for identifying futures contracts. See, e.g., In re
Stovall [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941 (Dec. 6, 1979); Policy
Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (CFTC 1989).
5. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6(a)-(d).
6. See, e.g., CFTC v. Noble Metals Int'l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.
filed, (Mar. 21, 1996); In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1991); Transnor (Berm.) Ltd. v. BP N.
Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1489-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (involving the CEA's forward con-
tract exclusion).
7. See, e.g., Robert B. Hiden, Jr., et al., Equity Swaps Revisited, FUTURES INT'L L. LETTER,
May-June 1995, at 8-15. See also infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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Over the years, certain issues regarding the classification of an
instrument as a security or a futures contract have been clarified. In
1982, the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") agreed to a jurisdictional accord, helping to clarify the juris-
diction of each agency with respect to certain financial instruments,
such as options on securities and futures or options on indices of se-
curities.8 Also, the CFTC issued an interpretation and then an ex-
emption that provided frameworks for analysis of securities with
commodity-dependent components. 9
The legal status of other financial instruments, including certain
swaps, remains less clear. For example, the SEC brought an adminis-
trative proceeding against BT Securities Corporation, a subsidiary of
Bankers Trust New York Corporation, involving several swap agree-
ments that Gibson Greetings, Inc. purchased from BT Securities Cor-
poration.10 In the 1994 order announcing and settling the
administrative action, the SEC, inter alia, determined that two of the
swap agreements that were individually-negotiated, cash-settled, over-
the-counter options on the prices, yields, or spreads of debt securities
issued by the United States Treasury Department were securities."
More recently, the United States District Court of the Southern
District of Ohio held, in connection with a grant of summary judg-
ment motions for Bankers Trust, which was involved in litigation with
the Procter & Gamble Corporation, that, inter alia, the interest rate
swaps at issue were not securities under either Ohio or federal securi-
ties laws.12 In reaching its decision, the court explained that the swaps
failed the SEC v. Howey' 3 and Reves v. Ernst & Young 14 tests in vari-
ous ways, and that the swaps were not options on securities. 15
8. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2a.
9. Part 34 of the CEA Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 5580 (CFTC 1993).
10. See In re BT Sec. Corp. [1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,477
(Dec. 22, 1994).
11. See id. Upon the issuance of the order, the SEC simultaneously released an exemptive
order that temporarily exempted certain swap dealers engaging in similar instruments from bro-
ker-dealer registration requirements. See Order Exempting Certain Brokers and Dealers from
Broker-Dealer Registration [1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 85, 476 (Dec.
22, 1994) [hereinafter SEC Order]. The SEC extended the temporary relief. See id. 86,108.
See also Kenneth M. Raisler and Alison M. Gregory, Regulatory and Legal Issues, in MANAGING
ENERGY PRICE RISK 1, 280 n.12 (Risk Publ'g, 1995) [hereinafter Regulatory and Legal Issues].
12. See Procter & Gamble Co v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1277-83 (S.D. Ohio
1996).
13. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
14. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
15. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. at 1277-83. The Court's
determination that the swaps were not securities appears arguably to create some tension with
the SEC Order. See, supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, issues can arise regarding products that contain
both futures and securities elements. 16 While interesting, such prod-
uct-related topics are beyond the scope of this Article and are dis-
cussed elsewhere, including in some of the other articles included in
this Symposium.
B. Beyond Product-Related Issues: Issues Pertaining to Market
Participants and Their Relationships
In recent years, derivatives market participants and regulators
have devoted considerable attention to non-product-related issues.
Increasingly, they are focusing on issues pertaining to types of market
participants as well as the nature of the relationship between market
participants.
The status of market participants has always been relevant to the
basic contract. For example, it is fairly standard in the over-the-
counter ("OTC") derivatives market for dealers to assess their
counterparty's capacity and authority to enter into derivative transac-
tions, in addition to analyzing other enforceability-related matters of
contract law. The type of market participant can also be important to
the authority analysis necessary for an OTC derivatives dealer to
transact with a regulated entity, such as an insurance company, munic-
ipality, or pension plan. In addition to the usual authority inquiry, a
counterparty seeking to transact with such a regulated entity should
consider any relevant statutory or regulatory framework that could
restrict such an entity's activities. 17
In addition to such issues, a number of releases in recent years
have addressed other issues regarding the types of market participants
and the relationships between them. Some supervisory regulators
have released guidelines regarding the derivative activities of the enti-
ties they supervise. Along these lines, banking regulators, for exam-
ple, concerned about the safety and soundness of the banks under
their supervision, have issued a plethora of such guidelines, beginning
with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's ("OCC") Octo-
ber 1993 Banking Circular 277,18 to guide national banks in con-
ducting their risk management activities with regard to derivatives.
16. See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
17. For example, certain regulatory requirements must be satisfied for netting provisions of
a derivatives contract involving an entity subject to the FDI Act in the event of a bankruptcy of
the entity.
18. See Risk Management of Financial Derivatives, Banking Circular No. 277 [1995] 5 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 62-152, at 71-703-12 (Oct. 27, 1993).
[Vol. 71:1181
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The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System then issued
its guidelines for examiners.' 9 Numerous bank regulatory releases
have since been issued concerning a variety of derivatives-related
topics.20
Other supervisory or self-regulatory bodies also are attempting to
provide instruction regarding their respective regulated entities. For
example, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has
been preparing a Model Act to guide the derivative activities of insur-
ance companies. 21
Furthermore, during the past few years, various industry associa-
tion groups have worked together to create "best practices" or stan-
dards. During 1993, the "Group of Thirty" issued its
recommendations regarding OTC derivatives. 22 The "Group of
Thirty" is comprised of central bankers, bankers, lawyers, and other
industry representatives. The "Group of Thirty" report provided a
valuable overview of derivatives and derivatives markets and issued a
number of recommendations. 23 Other significant industry association
efforts include the Derivatives Policy Group's Framework for Volun-
tary Oversight24 and the Treasury Management Association's Volun-
tary Principles and Practices Guidelines for End- Users of Derivatives.25
The industry association effort that will be analyzed in detail in
the following section is the Principles. The Principles are voluntary,
although it is expected that market participants generally will adhere
to them due to their benefits (described below). They establish as-
sumptions which can affect the rights and obligations of counterpar-
ties, including dealers and end-users, to wholesale transactions, in the
absence of written agreements to the contrary.
Further, the Principles are in addition to, and do not change or
modify, other published guidance, including OCC Banking Circular
19. See Regulatory and Legal Issues, supra note 11, at text accompanying note 79.
20. For example, see the OCC report entitled Futures Commission Merchant Activities, 935
PLI/Corp. 9 at 317-42 (Prac. L. Inst., April 1996), and see the OCC and the Federal Reserve
Bank's memorandum, B4-7122, regarding credit derivatives, reprinted in SWAPS AND OTHER DE-
RIVATIVES IN 1996 935-70 (Prac. L. Inst. 1996).
21. See Regulatory and Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 202 n.57.
22. See id. at 275 and n.52.
23. See id.
24. See Derivatives Policy Group, Framework for Voluntary Oversight. A Framework for
Voluntary Oversight of the OTC Derivatives Activities of Securities Firm Affiliates to Promote
Confidence and Stability in Financial Markets, in DERIVATIVES REGULATION 97 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7086, 1995).
25. See Treasury Management Association, Voluntary Principles and Practices Guidelines
for End-Users of Derivatives (Oct. 1995) (unpublished).
1996]
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277, the Federal Reserve's Examination Guidelines,26 the Voluntary
Framework agreed to by the Derivatives Policy Group and submitted
to the SEC, the National Association of Securities Dealers'
("NASD") suitability release, and such statutes, rules, regulations, and
common law as may be applicable. 27
C. The Principles and Practices for Wholesale Financial
Market Transactions
1. Summary of the Principles
The Principles were released on August 17, 1995, by a number of
industry association groups coordinated by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York.28 The groups involved in the preparation of the Princi-
ples were the Emerging Markets Traders Association, the Foreign Ex-
change Committee (independent of but sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York), the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, the New York Clearing House Association, the Public
Securities Association, and The Securities Industry Association. 29
The Principles "are intended to provide guidance for the conduct
of wholesale transactions in the over-the-counter financial markets
between Participants ('Transactions'). '' 30 The Principles also "confirm
the arm's-length nature of Transactions and describe the assumptions
that Participants make about each other" and include a set of "best
practices" that Participants "should aspire to achieve in connection
with their Transactions. ' 31
The definitions of the terms "Transaction" and "Participant" in
the Principles indicate the scope of the Principles. The term "Transac-
tion" encompasses not only swaps and other derivative32 transactions,
but also a wide variety of other wholesale transactions. Nevertheless,
this article will generally focus on the application of the Principles
with respect to privately-negotiated, bilateral swap agreements.
26. See, Regulatory and Legal Issues, supra note 11, at text accompanying note 79.
27. See Principles, supra note 2, § 1.3.
28. See generally, Principles, supra note 2.
29. See id.
30. Principles, supra note 2, § 1.1.
31. Id. § 1.2.
32. Derivative instruments include futures, forwards, options, swaps, caps, floors, collars,
swaptions and other similar instruments. Derivatives have values that are related to the values
of underlying assets, such as interest rates, currency exchange rates, commodity prices or securi-
ties prices. For the purposes of this article's analysis of the Principles, the term "derivative" and




The Principles define the term "Participant" to mean "any corpo-
ration, partnership, trust, government or other entity that engages reg-
ularly in one or more types of Transactions. ' 33 While broad, this
definition includes the words "engages regularly" because the Princi-
ples are not intended to apply to transactions involving infrequent
participants in wholesale transactions markets. However, some com-
mentators, such as the End Users Derivative Association, have ex-
pressed concerns regarding the potential scope of the Principles'
application and criticized the drafters of the Principles for failing to
specify the level of transactional activity that would constitute "engag-
ing regularly. '34
It is also noteworthy that the definition of the term Participant
does not include natural persons. 35 An earlier draft circulated for in-
dustry comment included, in the definition of the term "Participant,"
eligible swap participants, as such term is defined in the CFTC's swap
exemption.36 The CFTC swap exemption's definition of the term "eli-
gible swap participant" includes natural persons with total assets ex-
ceeding ten million dollars. 37
Next, Sections Two and Three of the Principles set forth a
number of "best practices" to which Participants should adhere. Sec-
tion Two provides that a Participant's financial resources should be
adequate in light of the Participant's Transactions' material risks and
commitments. 38
Section Three addresses the policies and procedures appropriate
for Participants:
With respect to policies and procedures of the types identified in the
Principles, a Participant should have policies approved by its board
of directors, a committee thereof or an appropriate level of senior
management. An appropriate level of senior management should
approve controls and procedures to implement these policies. All
policies, controls and procedures should be appropriate to the size,
nature and complexity of the Participant and its Transactions, and
should be reviewed as business and market circumstances change. 39
The Section then details a number of appropriate policies and proce-
dures. These policies and procedures address, among other things, the
supervision and training of employees, risk management procedures,
33. Principles, supra note 2, § 1.1.
34. See, Futures Commission Merchant Activities, supra note 20, at 774.
35. See Principles, supra note 2, § 1.1.
36. See Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17 C.F.R. § 35 (1996).
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 35(b)(2)(xi) (1996).
38. See Principles, supra note 2, § 2.1.
39. Id. § 3.1.
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independent risk monitoring, valuation procedures, credit risk proce-
dures, procedures regarding the provision of valuations to others, pro-
cedures with respect to the Participant's reasonably satisfying itself of
its counterparty's legal capacity and authority to enter into the Trans-
action, and internal control and compliance procedures to ensure that
its Transactions will be conducted "in accordance with applicable legal
and regulatory requirements, internal policies and any specific re-
quirements contained in any agreements applicable to its
transactions."''
The most controversial aspects of the Principles involve the Prin-
ciples' provisions regarding various assumptions relating to the nature
of the relationship between Participants that will govern, subject to
applicable law, unless the Participants to the relevant transactions
agree otherwise in writing. Some assumptions set forth in the Princi-
ples pertain to the arm's-length nature of the relationship between the
Participants.
Section Four of the Principles contains assumptions and engen-
ders the most controversy. Section 4.2 provides that a Participant
"should satisfy itself that it has the capability (internally or through
independent professional advice) to understand and make independ-
ent decisions about its Transactions. '41 It also states "[a]bsent a writ-
ten agreement to the contrary, a Participant should expect that its
counterparty will assume that the Participant has the capability to un-
derstand and make independent decisions about its Transactions and
will act accordingly. ' 42 Similarly, Section 4.2.2 provides that:
[aibsent a written agreement or an applicable law, rule or regulation
that expressly imposes affirmative obligations to the contrary, a
counterparty receiving [communications regarding transaction or
market suggestions, ideas or information] should assume that the
Participant is acting at arm's length for its own account and that
such communications are not recommendations or investment ad-
vice on which the counterparty may rely.43
If a Participant does not desire to make an independent investment
decision and wants to rely on its counterparty's communications, the
Participant should so inform its counterparty in writing before enter-
ing into a Transaction that will involve the Participant's reliance on
such counterparty. 44
40. Id. § 3.3.
41. Id. § 4.2.1.
42. Id. § 4.2.1.
43. Id. § 4.2.2.
44. See id. § 4.2.2.
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Section Four also contains a fair dealing and professional stan-
dards provision. This provision provides that:
A Participant should act honestly and in good faith when marketing,
entering into, executing and administering Transactions. A Partici-
pant should act in a manner designed to promote public confidence
in the wholesale financial markets. In addition, a Participant should
show its counterparties professional courtesy and consideration. 45
Section Five of the Principles also addresses considerations relat-
ing to relationships between Participants. Section 5.1 suggests, inter
alia, that Participants, especially dealers, "should maintain policies
and procedures that identify and address circumstances that can lead
to uncertainties, misunderstandings or disputes with the potential for
relationship, reputational or litigation risk."' 46 Section Five discusses a
number of practices in which a Participant "may wish" to engage. For
example, it states that a Participant "may wish to maintain policies
and procedures for identifying (based on information in the posses-
sion of the representative of the Participant executing the Transaction
... ) and addressing exceptional situations. . . " that could affect the
counterparty's ability to understand or make independent decisions
about the Transaction or to undertake the risk involved in the Trans-
action. 47 Section Five also notes that a Participant may wish to pro-
vide additional information to assist the counterparty in its decision-
making with respect to the Transaction48 and may wish to inform its
counterparty of the nature of the relationship between Participants. 49
The final sections of the Principles, Sections Six and Seven, in-
volve aspects of the mechanics of Transactions, including confirma-
tions, documentation, payment and settlement instructions, and
standards for Transactions (such as market terminology and
conventions).
2. Possible Benefits
Participants to wholesale financial transactions are afforded vari-
ous benefits by the adoption and utilization of the Principles. These
benefits include the commencement of a dialogue on potentially am-
biguous issues, clarifications regarding the nature of the relationship
by filling contractual "gaps," the articulation of "best practices" to
45. Id. § 4.1.
46. Id. § 5.1.
47. Id. § 5.2.
48. See id. § 5.4.
49. See id. § 5.3.
19961
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guide such Participants, and a possible reduction of the likelihood of
unwanted or unnecessary legislation.
The Principles describe in detail the nature of the relationship
between the Participants involved in the relevant Transactions.50 For
example, Section Four provides that each Participant understands the
Transaction and that neither party acts as a fiduciary to the other.5' If
the Participants disagree with these assumptions, the delivery of the
Principles increases the likelihood that the Participant with a different
understanding will commence a dialogue with regard to such assump-
tions. If such a dialogue occurs, it may benefit both Participants by
identifying the parties' differences in their understandings and, hope-
fully, by clarifying the terms of their relationship.
Another possible benefit relies upon contractual theory. Adop-
tion of the Principles by Participants may also serve a valuable con-
tractual function by creating "default" rules that can "fill gaps" to the
extent that the contract would otherwise remain incomplete.5 2 The
Principles' assumptions are not immutable rules; rather, they are de-
fault rules or agreements that expressly provide that they may be
changed by the parties' written agreement.5 3
As Professors Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott explained:
Most contract rules are permissive, applying only if the parties do
not otherwise agree. By providing standardized and widely suitable
risk allocations in advance, the law enables most parties to select a
preformulated legal norm 'off the rack,' thus eliminating the cost of
negotiating every detail of the proposed arrangement. Atypical
parties remain free to bargain for customized provisions, much as a
person with an unusual physique may purchase custom-tailored gar-
ments for a premium rather than accept a standard size and cut
available at a lower price.
Ideally, the preformulated rules . . . should mimic the agree-
ments contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to bar-
gain out each detail of the transaction.54
Another potential benefit of the Principles is its articulation of
"best practices" for all Participants. Provisions, such as those, regard-
ing financial capabilities and a variety of risk-management policies
and procedures, provide a helpful list of appropriate considerations
50. See, e.g., Principles, supra note 2, § 4.
51. See id. § 4.2.1.
52. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87-88 (1989) (detailing a variety of types of efficient
contractual "defaults").
53. See id. at 87.
54. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of
the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 270 (1985).
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and safeguards to guide Participants engaging in wholesale
transactions.
Finally, to the extent that some industry associations or market
participants seek to avoid what they consider to be unwanted or un-
necessary legislation or regulation, the existence of the Principles (or
other general standards) might provide a benefit to such industry as-
sociations or markets participants to the extent that the existence and
use of the Principles help to avoid additional legislation or regulation.
3. Possible Concerns and Responses
Concerns about the Principles include those expressed by a group
of "end users." Some of the end users contend that the Principles'
assumptions favor dealers and should not apply with respect to them.
Some of these commentators also expressed concerns about the possi-
bility that, if the Principles bind the parties, they might shift burdens
to the detriment of end users. Not only are such commentators op-
posed to any burden shifting away from dealers, but they also argue
that the Principles are too burdensome to small end users because
they place the onus on such end users to be on notice regarding the
existence of the assumptions and of their need to provide written
statements when these assumptions are inapposite.
In particular, the assumptions regarding the "arm's-length" na-
ture of the relationship and the assumption providing that neither Par-
ticipant is acting as an advisor or fiduciary to the other, while
supported by many market participants, appear contrary to certain
other appropriateness or suitability trends. For example, the NASD
has issued a suitability proposal and OCC Banking Circular 277 in-
cluded an appropriateness-type inquiry. 55
In response, members of the drafting committee explained that
their intention was to identify the arm's-length terms and assumptions
that were already the standards in wholesale financial markets for
these bilateral agreements. The drafters contend that the assumptions
and "best practices" merely reflect the general state of affairs among
the majority of counterparties and/or transactions, and serve to clarify
and initiate a discussion. As discussed above, such "gap fillings" and
clarifications may be quite helpful in reducing the likelihood of misun-
derstandings and the possibility of ambiguities.5 6
55. See, Regulatory and Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 275-76.
56. See, supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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In this regard, the drafters appear to be contending that these
default rules are "untailored" default rules reflecting what the major-
ity of contracting parties would want, thereby reducing contract nego-
tiation and related transactional costs. 57 According to the Coase
Theorem:
if bargaining costs are sufficiently low, resources that can be bar-
gained over will end up in the hands of which ever party values
them most .... [I]f transaction costs are low, it won't matter (as far
as the decision to perform or breach is concerned) whether the law
gives the performing party a right to breach and pay damages, or
whether it gives the nonperforming party the right to block the
other party's breach through a remedy of specific performance. If
breach is efficient . . . and the law does not give the performing
party the right to breach, that party will simply purchase that right
from the nonperforming party.5 8
Thus, the Coase Theorem and the drafters' negotiating-cost argument
support placing the default rules in accordance with the majority
wishes.
In light of the foregoing, and assuming that the drafters' conten-
tion (i.e., that the assumptions are in accordance with the majority of
transactions and relationships) is correct, it may be possible to attri-
bute certain end user critics' denunciation of the Principles to a strate-
gic position. In part, they might strategically prefer the ambiguity
resulting from an incomplete contract with respect to such terms.5 9
For example, the strategy may relate to a counterparty's belief (mis-
taken or not) that the Principles could weaken their ability to argue
successfully certain claims (such as its reliance on the other party and
that the other party acted as a fiduciary or advisor). Consider Judge
Feikens' Procter & Gamble v. Bankers Trust decision regarding
Procter & Gamble claims against Bankers Trust. The judge rejected a
fiduciary duty claim holding, inter alia, that an arm's-length,
counterparty relationship existed and that Banker's Trust's "superior
knowledge" with respect to swap transactions did "not convert their
business relationship into one in which fiduciary duties are
imposed."60
57. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also
Ayres and Gertner, supra note 52.
58. RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 54 (1994).
59. Analogously, Ayres and Gertner explain that "a second source of contractual incom-
pleteness . . . [is] strategic." Ayres & Gertner, supra note 52, at 94. The strategy discussed in
their article is a strategy to withhold information. See id.
60. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1289 (S.D. Ohio
1996). However, Judge Feikens did state that duties to disclose may arise due to superior knowl-
edge, even in the absence of fiduciary duty.
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In any event, it is important to note that the Principles' terms may
not defeat such claims because disclosures or statements in an agree-
ment may not always control depending on the relevant facts. As
Douglas Harris, former Senior Deputy Comptroller of the OCC,
noted in a letter to Stephen Greene, Credit Suisse Financial Prod-
ucts's then Managing Director and London General Counsel, a disclo-
sure that a Participant is acting "solely in the capacity of an arm's-
length contractual counterparty" may not achieve its goal of limiting
liability if the transaction results in a legal dispute. 61
On the other hand, such end users' criticisms may be the product
of their sincere disagreement with the drafters' contention that these
terms and assumptions represent the typical assumptions applicable to
the majority of transactions and relationships in derivatives markets.
If this is the case, then this fact underscores the need for the discus-
sion that the Principles have helped, and may continue, to evoke.
When two parties to a bilateral agreement have a sincere difference in
their understanding of the terms of their agreement, a discussion to
clarify the terms is necessary and appropriate. 62
Other concerns stem from the articulation of industry association
standards. One such concern involves possible litigation scenarios in
which both end users and dealers fear that the Principles might be
used to their disadvantage. As discussed above, it is conceivable that
some end users may be concerned that they will be held to the terms
and assumptions contained in Section Four to their detriment. Mean-
while, others may be concerned that the "best practices" expressed
therein might be deemed to establish industry standards or a course of
conduct to which they may be held to their detriment.
One final concern of note is whether the Principles would be
binding on Participants regardless of whether or not the Participants
received the Principles. In this regard, note that Section Five states
that a Participant may want to notify its counterparty of the Princi-
ples' application.63
61. See James C. Allen, Generic Derivative Reports Fall Short, OCC Official Warns, Am.
Banker, Nov. 6, 1995.
62. In fact, these assumptions may appear particularly appropriate in light of the fact that
derivatives transactions are unlike a public securities offering where a significant disparity in
access to information exists because one party (namely the issuer) has greater access to perti-
nent, material information.
63. See, Principles, supra note 2, § 5.3.
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D. The Shift Toward Increasing Supervisory Regulation and the
Articulation of Industry Association Standards-Effects on
Market Participants
While some critics of releases or "best practices" have denounced
aspects of these documents and, in particular, some disagree with the
assumptions contained in the Principles, the increasing attention to
the internal policies and procedures of derivative market participants
and their relationships with each other makes the articulation of what
are now, in some cases, "unwritten assumptions" more vital than ever.
At the very least, a discussion of guidelines or principles, such as the
Principles, can provoke an examination of many issues that may now
seem ambiguous, at least to some. Moreover, the attention on inter-
nal policies and procedures, and discussions and clarifications with re-
spect to the relationships among market participants, will likely
prevent some internal problems and transactional disputes.
